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THE RIGHT OF THE PRESS TO GATHER
INFORMATION AFTER BRANZBURG AND PELL
This Comment will examine the constitutional basis for a
right of the press to gather information in the face of govern-
ment restrictions. It will attempt to show that such a right is con-
sistent both with the understanding of freedom of the press in
the early United States and with traditional first amendment
interpretation. The tentative recognition of that right in Branz-
burg v. Hayes' and its limitation in Pell v. Procunier2 will then be
analyzed, and a more expansive formulation of the right will be
proposed.
I. THE RIGHT TO GATHER INFORMATION
Constitutional rights specific to the press derive from the
"freedom of the press" clause of the first amendment.3 The Su-
preme Court has explicitly recognized rights to publish without
prior restraint 4 and with anonymity, 5 to circulate6 and personally
distribute literature, 7 and to receive printed communications. 8
1 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
2 417 U.S. 817 (1974). Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974), is a
companion case.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press .... " The freedom of the press was applied to the states through
the fourteenth amendment in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
4 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931).
5 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
6 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); cf. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S.
(6 Otto) 727, 733 (1878).
7 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444
(1938).
8 Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Id. at 307-08 (Brennan, J.,
concurring). See also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 534 (1945); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943).
A related concept is the "public right to know," a phrase associated with Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). That case held constitutional the "fairness
doctrine" that broadcasters have a duty to discuss controversial issues of public impor-
tance fully and fairly. As articulated in Red Lion, however, this duty arises only because of
the scarcity of transmission frequencies. The limited scope of the general "public right to
know" apparently has been affirmed in Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972). But
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Before Branzburg,9 however, the Court had never explicitly
acknowledged that "freedom of the press" includes a right to
gather information. 10 On the other hand, neither had it denied
the existence of such a right.
A. Historical Validity
The absence until recently of judicial consideration of a
news-gathering right in the face of governmental restrictions is
not surprising. Prior to World War II governmental secrecy was
minimal, thereby rendering conflict unlikely. Today, govern-
mental secrecy has reached vast proportions." This sudden
growth in governmental secrecy is directly traceable to the se-
curity orders of Presidents Truman 12 and Eisenhower 3 in the
see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 721 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The Red Lion right to a full and fair discussion of issues differs from the right to
receive specific communications of information and ideas in that the latter is an indi-
vidual right of the person to whom the specific communication is addressed, whereas the
former is a right of the public generally. For a discussion of the distinction between these
concepts, see Note, Public and Press Rights of Access to Prisoners after Branzburg and Mandel,
82 YALE L.J. 1337, 1344-45 (1973).
9 The four dissenters in Branzburg wholeheartedly endorsed the right to gather in-
formation, but the degree of its acceptance by the majority is open to differing interpre-
tations. See text accompanying notes 63-113 infra.
'0 Note the lack of direct authority in the endorsements of news gathering by all the
opinions in Bran±burg, 408 U.S. at 681, 707 (opinion of the Court), at 709 (Powell, J.,
concurring), at 721-23 (Douglas, J., dissenting), and at 725-28 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
The closest the Supreme Court came to recognizing an information-gathering right
prior to Branzburg was in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965): "The right to speak and
publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information." (emphasis
supplied). This case is discussed in text accompanying notes 96-102 infra.
In two cases involving prejudicial publicity, the Court did not reach the question of a
right to gather news. In Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), the Court ruled that
televising the trial over the defendant's objections denied due process, but noted:
It is true that the public has the right to be informed as to what occurs in its
courts, but reporters of all media, including television, are always present if they
wish to be and are plainly free to report whatever occurs in open court through
their respective media.
381 U.S. at 541-42. In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) (reversing a conviction
because of prejudicial publicity), the Court had strong things to say about controlling
press abuses that had created a "carnival atmosphere at trial." 384 U.S. at 358. The right
of the press to attend the trial in an orderly manner, however, was not questioned. Id. at
350.
For an excellent discussion ofjudicial treatment of press rights to gather information
written shortly before Branzburg was decided, see Note, The Right of the Press to Gather
Information, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 838 (1971).
11 See generally B. LADD, CRISIS IN CREDIBILITY (1968); W. SWINDLER, PROBLEMS OF
LAW IN JOURNALISM 77-83 (1955).
12 Exec. Order No. 10,290, 3 C.F.R. 789 (1949-53 comp.).
13 Exec. Order No. 10,501, 3 C.F.R. 979 (1949-53 comp.). See also Letter from
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1950's.' 4 Issued against the background of the cold war, these
directives authorized classifications by all executive departments
and agencies. In contrast, the prominent American political
theorist Francis Lieber wrote in 1853: "The principle of publicity
so pervaded all the American politics, that the framers of our
constitution probably never thought of it, or if they did, they did
not think it worth while to provide for it in the constitution,
since no one had doubted it.'
15
It may be stated with confidence that the framers believed' 6
that freedom of the press, at a minimum, forbade government
licensing. Freedom from "restraints in advance of publication"
was an accepted press liberty in late 18th century America.' 7
Beyond this, there is little evidence as to the framers' under-
standing of freedom of the press; indeed, there is evidence that
they were unclear about its meaning.' 8 In The Federalist, Hamil-
ton wrote that freedom of the press is a concept that defies
definition; its meaning is to be given content by "the general
spirit of the people and of the government."' 9
The absence of recorded debate over a news-gathering right
as a concept inherent in the freedom of the press clause may be
Dwight D. Eisenhower to Secretary of Defense, May 17, 1954, in H.R. REP. No. 2947,
84th Cong., 2d Sess. 64-65 (1956).
11 During the Civil War, the press had substantial access to military information. See
J. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 477-510 (1926). Congress de-
clined to authorize security classification during World War I. See. New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 733-34 (1971) (White, J., concurring). For some concrete
examples of access problems arising in the 1940's, and an interesting discussion, see
Note, Access to Official Information: A Neglected Constitutional Right, 27 IND. L.J. 209 (1952).
15 F. LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT (1853), excerpted in FREEDOI
OF THE PRESS FROM HAMILTON TO THE WARREN COURT 381 (H. Nelson ed. 1967)
[hereinafter cited as LIEBER, with pagination to the Nelson excerpt].
16 Determining the framers' intent is often an exercise in futility. See C. CURTIS,
LIONS UNDER THE THRONE 2-8 (1947). See generally M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (1911); tenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of
Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction (pts. 1-5), 26 CALIF. L. REV. 287, 437, 664
(1938), 27 CALIF. L. REV. 157, 399, 405-06 (1939); Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses
offHisto , in Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502 (1964). This is especially so
where, as here, there is little evidence. Moreover, such a determination, if possible, would
not necessarily be dispositive of the issue. See Bickel, The Original Understanding and the
Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955). Nevertheless, early commentary on the
freedom of the press clause can provide insights useful in interpreting its current role.
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273-76 (1964).
17 See FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON lv-lvi (L. Levy ed. 1966)
[hereinafter cited as FREEDOM].
1" See L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 183, 200, 214-16 (1960) [hereinafter cited as
LEGACY]; Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891, 898 (1949).
1" THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 535 (B. Wright ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton).
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attributed to a number of factors. First, there was no institu-
tionalized executive bureaucracy; 20 hence there was no orga-
nized attempt to withhold information. Second, newspapers
were poorly staffed and not highly organized, and thus were not
in a position to gather news assertively. Finally, it is unlikely that
the press was hampered in obtaining information. The rampant
partisanship of the early Republic extended into the executive
branch, because the President and Vice-President were of dif-
ferent parties, and information detrimental to one side was
often handed to the partisan printer by the other. It was a com-
mon occurrence, for example, for newspapers to publish the
results of cabinet meetings.
2 1
Although there is no record of public debate in the early
Republic over secrecy of information, there was a great deal of
controversy about the law of seditious libel.22 After exten-
sive debate truth was recognized as a defense in seditious libel
prosecutions. 23 The rejection of the prior doctrine that truth
heightened the crime by bringing the government into greater
disrepute24 indicates a belief that government should not be
permitted to keep embarrassing secrets out of print. This sug-
gests an outlook consistent with a press right to gather informa-
tion.
One contrary indication of the availability of information
during this time was the Senate's closed door policy. It was not
until February, 1794, that the Senate opened its galleries to the
press.2 5 But this was merely a short-term holdover of the
20 Cf 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 454 (1789) (remarks of James Madison, June 8, 1789):
"In our Government it is, perhaps, less necessary to guard against the abuse in the execu-
tive department than in any other; because it is not the stronger branch of the system,
but the weaker .... "
21 See J. DANIELS, ORDEAL OF AMBITION (1970).
22 The debate is now carried on by historians. Compare LEGACY, supra note 18, with I.
BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1965).
23See FREEDOM, supra note 17, at lxxi, 147-53; LEGACY, supra note 18, at 130-31,
197-98.
24 See FREEDOM, supra note 17, at xxv; LEGACY, supra note 18, at 130.
25 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 15-16 (1789) (parenthetical remark by reporter). Some con-
gressional secrecy clearly was contemplated by the framers of the Constitution. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 5.
Charles Pinckney later stated: "It is important here to remind you, of the anxiety of
the State Legislatures in insisting upon the doors of the Senate being thrown open, and
their legislative proceedings exposed, like the other branch, to public view." 10 ANNALS
OF CONG. 79 (1800).
Whether the first amendment was invoked in the debates to open the Senate gal-
leries is, for obvious reasons, unreported.
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colonial legislatures' assertions of "parliamentary privilege. 26
Shortly after independence most states rejected this doctrine
and required open debates by their legislatures.27 Debates in the
House of Representatives were open from the start.
28
Political theorists of the early Republic provide some sup-
port for the existence and necessity of a press right to gather
information. 29 Madison wrote that both information and the
means for acquiring it are essential to a popular government.
30
Tunis Wortman, a Jeffersonian political theorist, wrote in 1800
that because all men are eligible for public office in a representa-
tive commonwealth,
[t]he idea of Secrecy is peculiarly repugnant to the
theory of Representative Institution, except in those
solitary instances which render temporary concealment
necessary....
Secondly, The liberty of investigation is equally
indispensible to the judicious exercise of the elective
right....
Thirdly, It is to be observed, That the Representa-
tive System unavoidably implies an absolute right to
investigate the conduct of all public officers....
For this purpose it is indispensibly requisite that
26 See generally M. CLARKE, PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES
(1943); WITTKE, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH PARLIAMENTARY PRIVILEGE (1970). The con-
cept of parliamentary privilege, however, is appropriate only to the British and colonial
systems where political theory held that sovereignty rested in the legislative body. Cf. G.
WooD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 523-32 (1969). It has
been reported that the first case of authorized publicity of the deliberations of a pre-




See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. XV (1777), reproduced in THE FEDERAL AND STATE
CONSTITUTIONS 2632 (Thorpe ed. 1909); PA. CONST. art. IX, § 7 (1790), quoted in note 53
infra; cf. LIEBER, supra note 15, at 381-82; Junius, Addresses to the Honorable, the Members of
the House of Assembly of the State of New York, quoted in FREEDOM, supra note 17, at 168.
28 It can be inferred from the reporter's apology for the Senate's closed doors, see
note 25 supra, that the House was open. The same inference can be drawn from the full
account of the debates. As early as June 8, 1789, a member remarked that the debates
"are offered to the public view, and held up to the inspection of the world." I ANNALS OF
CONG. 460 (1789) (remarks of Representative Jackson). Later in 1789, one Representative
moved to censure reporters for unfair reporting of the debates of the House. Id. 952
(remarks of representative Burke). The motion evoked the response from another Rep-
resentative that the question involved "an attack upon the liberty of the press." Id. 954
(remarks of Representative Hartley). It is unclear how widely this sentiment was shared,
for the debate was short and ambiguous; but the motion was withdrawn. Id.
29 See generally LEGACY, supra note 18, at 128, 130, 176-77.
30 9 THE WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON 103 (G. Hunt ed. 1910).
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political measures should be published in circumstan-
tial detail, and also that Investigation should remain
entirely unrestricted. 3'
And in 1789, John Adams wrote of the Massachusetts free press
clause:
Our chief magistrates and Senators &c are annually
eligible by the people. How are their characters and
conduct to be known to their constituents but by the
press? If the press is stopped and the people kept in
Ignorance we had much better have the first magis-
trate and Senators hereditary.
32
Despite the scarcity of evidence, it is apparent that a press
right to gather information is compatible with the concept of
freedom of the press understood by many politicians and polit-
ical theorists of the early American Republic.
B. Consistency with Traditional First Amendment
Interpretation
Although the Supreme Court has often recognized that
informing the public is an important interest underlying the
guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press, the
Court's expressions of that purpose have usually emphasized
the dissemination of already acquired information rather than
the acquisition of information that is to be disseminated. For
example, in a 1945 Supreme Court opinion Justice Black de-
clared that the first amendment "rests on the assumption that
the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse
and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the pub-
lic . . . . 33 Such expressions of the interests underlying freedom
of the press are not confined to the "absolutist" interpretation
of the first amendment, of which Justice Black has been the
foremost proponent. 34 In the same case Justice Frankfurter,
31 T. WORTMAN, A TREATISE CONCERNING POLITICAL ENQUIRY, AND THE LIBERTY OF
THE PRESS (1800), excerpted in FREEDOM, supra note 17, at 266-68.
32 LEGACY, supra note 18, at 195. For the complete correspondence between Adams
and Chief Justice Cushing of Massachusetts, see FREEDOM, supra note 17, at 147-53. For
similar sentiments expressed by Chief Justice McKean of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, see Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 DalI.) 319, 325 (1788).
33 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
34 See Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U.L. REV. 865 (1960). See also Meiklejohn, The
First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245.
1975]
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 124:166
the noted advocate of "interest balancing, '35 adopted Judge
Learned Hand's observation that
the newspaper industry ... serves one of the most vital
of all general interests: the dissemination of news from
as many different sources, and with as many different
facets and colors as is possible. That interest is closely
akin to, if indeed it is not the same as, the interest pro-
tected by the First Amendment. .... 36
1. General Theories of First Amendment Adjudication
The importance of the informational aspect of freedom of
the press has unfortunately been overlooked in some cases.
This commonly has happened where courts apply the currently
popular theory of the first amendment as a guarantee of "free-
dom of expression. ' 37 When used to replace the constitutional
language, this otherwise useful phrase invites unwary judges to
leave the entire informational element behind in the transition
to a higher level of generality. 38 An example is Tribune Review
Publishing Co. v. Thomas,39 in which the Third Circuit declared:
Realizing that we are not dealing with freedom of ex-
pression at all but with rules having to do with gaining
access to information on matters of public interest,...
we think that this question of getting at what one wants
to know, either to inform the public or to satisfy one's
individual curiosity is a far cry from the type of free-
dom of expression, comment, criticism so fully pro-
tected by the first and fourteenth amendments of the
Constitution.
40
3 See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
11 326 U.S. at 28 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). While it is commonly asserted that
"absolutists" in fact engage in a balancing process to reach their definition of what is
protected by the first amendment, e.g., Note, The Speech and' Press Clause of the First
Amendment as Ordinary Language, 87 HARV. L. REv. 374, 380-81 (1973), it should be
equally clear that "balancers" must engage in a definition of interests before they can
strike the balance. The Frankfurter quotation illustrates a balancer including in the first
amendment a right to disseminate information.
37 This phrase appears in opinions at least as early as 1925. See Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 664 (1925).
38 The transition does not require the omission. For example, the relevance of infor-
mation to the first amendment was not ignored in a Supreme Court opinion which may
have attained the highest level of generality ever, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965): "[T]he State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, con-
tract the spectrum of available knowledge." Id. at 482.
39 254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958).40 Id. at 885.
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This language suggests a constitutional distinction between "in-
forming the public" and "freedom of expression"; it is at least
a concept of "freedom of expression" that lacks a right to gather
information. A more thoughtful analysis, however, recognizes
that the concept of freedom of expression should include an
information-gathering element. 41 A right of free expression
loses much of its force if the facts relevant to forming a judg-
ment are unavailable.
The more traditional theory of free speech and free press
rests on the conviction that the "mature free discussion of the
ultimate public forum [will] yield truth .... *42 A number of
Supreme Court opinions have expressed this idea with the image
of the "uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will
ultimately prevail . . . . 43 This theory clearly contemplates that
ideas will be formed from, and tested against, facts. It assumes
the availability of information necessary for the truth-finding
process.
44
2. The Distinction Between Freedom of Speech and
Freedom of the Press
Turning from general theories of the first amendment and
following Justice Black's admonition to look to the constitu-
tional language forces one to consider the differences between
freedom of speech and freedom of the press. 45 The striking
characteristic of Supreme Court opinions in this area is that one
freedom is seldom distinguished from the other.46 For example,
41 T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970).
42 W.E. HOCKING, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 91 (1947).
43 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); New York Times v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20
(1945); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
44 On the dangers of restricted access to fact under this theory, see HOCKING, supra
note 42, at 157-60. Meiklejohn, who rejected an abstract pursuit of truth but gave the
theory vitality by emphasizing effective self-government, recognized its informational
basis: "[T]he spreading of information and opinion bearing on [public] issues must have
a freedom unabridged by our agents." Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute,
1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 257. See also Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn
Interpretation of the First Amendment, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1965); Kalven, The New York Times
Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191, 209
(arguing that the Court, at least in the opinion's rhetoric and sweep, adopted the Meikle-
john view). For a view that the purpose of the first amendment is to protect communica-
tion "essential to the process of modifying beliefs," which communication is also based on
the presence of information, see DuVal, Free Communication of Ideas and the Quest for
Truth: Toward a Teleological Approach to First Amendment Adjudication, 41 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 161, 207 (1972).
45 For an interesting discussion of this subject, see HOCKING, supra note 42, at 79-87.
46 For a more detailed account of the Supreme Court's collapsing free press into free
1975]
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in Schenck v. United States,47 a case that involved the distribution
of pamphlets, the Court spoke only of "free speech"; freedom
of the press was not mentioned.
This view of freedom of the press as a particularized ver-
sion of free speech omits an information-gathering element;
but all of the other specific rights accorded to the press by the
Supreme Court interpretations of the first amendment48 can be
derived from free speech and assembly, if speech is taken to
include written and printed speech. Thus, publishing without
prior restraint corresponds to not being prohibited from speak-
ing;49anonymity is the written counterpart of associational
privacy; 50 and rights of circulation, distribution, and reception
would appear to be the equivalent of free assembly. If this view
is accepted, the free press clause serves only to apply the free
speech clause to printed matter.
However, there may be other rights peculiar to the func-
tions of the press, not derivable from the free speech clause,
which should be recognized. If so, the exercise of these rights
should rest exclusively in the press, while rights of free speech,
whatever the mode of communication, rest in the public.5' This
notion is implicit in James Madison's first articulation of what
eventually became the first amendment: "The people shall not
be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to
publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press, as one
of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.
52
speech, partly by use of the phrase "freedom of expression," see Note, The Right of the
Press to Gather Information, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 838, 840-43 (1971). See also Nimmer,
Introduction-Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech? 26
HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975) (arguing that speech and press are distinguishable and that the
Supreme Court has failed to recognize this distinction in cases as recent as Pell v. Pro-
cunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974)).
47 249 U.S. 47 (1919). See also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Patterson v.
Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907). Each of these cases cited both clauses without distinction,
even though only printed matter was involved. More recently justice Clark, in a dissent,
referred to "one who exercises his right of free speech through writing or distributing
handbills .... Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 71 (1960) (Clark, J., dissenting).
48 See text accompanying notes 3-10 supra.
41 See Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
-0 See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1958); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1960).
51 See Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. at 863-64 (Powell, J., dissenting).
51 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (1789) (remarks of James Madison); cf. PA. CONST. art. IX,
§ 7 (1790), reproduced in 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITTrrIoNs 3100 (Thorpe ed.
1909), which stated: "[Tihe printing presses shall be free to every person who undertakes
to examine the proceedings of the legislature, or any branch of the government,...." and
that "every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject .... "
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Two distinct concepts can be detected in this phraseology:
one corresponding to free speech, including written and printed
speech; another corresponding to a different freedom, asso-
ciated only with the press. In associating the distribution of
handbills with free speech, the Court has recognized the first
concept. But to go no further-to refuse to recognize the second
concept-is effectively to read "freedom of the press" out of the
Constitution.
A free press, as provided for in the first amendment,
occupies an important place in the American political system.
The special role of the press is to provide citizens with the infor-
mation necessary to make decisions about public policies and
public officials. The collection and dissemination of such in-
formation cannot be accomplished effectively by individuals
acting on their own behalf; some degree of professionalism and
organization is required. Adams recognized this when he asked,
"How are [the] character and conduct [of public officials] to be
known to their constituents but by the press? '5 3 As society has
become more complex, and government more institutionalized,
this quality of the press has assumed even more importance. Its
role as collector, as well as disseminator, of the information
necessary for effective self-government qualifies the press, as
an institution, for first amendment protection.
Characterization of the press as a separate institution would
appear to conflict with the Supreme Court doctrine that free-
dom of the press is a fundamental personal right.54 The Court
traditionally has disregarded the institutional nature of the
press in this context, and has extended the freedom of the press
guarantee to all who have chosen to distribute printed matter.55
However, this doctrine arises from cases concerning interfer-
ence with printed expression,56 and it therefore does not con-
trol the information-gathering cases, where the institutional
nature of the press assumes greater importance. The Supreme
Court has recognized the institutional needs of the press in
53 LEGACY, supra note 18, at 195.
54 Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938); see W. SWINDLER, PROBLEMS OF
LAW IN JOURNALISM 77-83 (1955).
55 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,
219 (1966); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111 (1943); Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938). The Court in Lovell stated: "The press in its historic connota-
tion comprehends every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and
opinion." Id. at 452.
-6 See text accompanying notes 48-50 supra.
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other contexts.57 Extending to the press a right of access to in-
formation would neither increase nor diminish the purely
personal rights heretofore recognized by the Supreme Court.
C. Supreme Court Recognition of Information
Gathering as a Part of "Freedom of the Press"
Although the Supreme Court has never articulated a first
amendment right to gather information, some support for that
right has appeared in dicta. In Grosjean v. American Press Co.,
58
for example, the Court recalled that British "taxes on knowl-
edge" imposed on the colonies were intended
to prevent, or curtail the opportunity for, the acquisi-
tion of knowledge by the people in respect of their
governmental affairs .... The aim of the struggle was
not to relieve taxpayers from a burden, but to estab-
lish and preserve the right of the English people to full
information in respect of the doings or misdoings of
their government.
59
More recently, concurring in New York Times Co. v. United
States,60 Justice Black declared:
The press was protected so that it could bare the
secrets of government and inform the people. Only a
free and unrestrained press can effectively expose de-
ception in government. And paramount among the
responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent
any part of the government from deceiving the peo-
ple and sending them off to distant lands to die of for-
eign fevers and foreign shot and shell. In my view, far
from deserving condemnation for their courageous re-
porting, the New York Times, the Washington Post,
and other newspapers should be commended for serv-
ing the purpose that the Founding Fathers saw so
clearly. In revealing the workings of government that
led to the Vietnam war, the newspapers nobly did
57 See, e.g., Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); cf. Stewart, "Or of
the Press," 26 Hastings L.J. 631, 633-34 (1975).
58 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
59 Id. at 246-47 (1936). See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964), where
the Court spoke of "the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the
people, concerning public officials, their servants."
60403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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precisely that which the Founders hoped and trusted
they would do.
6 1
A majority of justices in this case believed they were applying
the first amendment against the federal executive and judiciary,
setting an important precedent for press access claims against
the federal government.
62
A right to gather information was first actively explored in
the Supreme Court by the dissenting opinions in Branzburg v.
Hayes.6 3 The majority and concurring opinions, however, while
explicitly recognizing the right's existence, did not explore it
enough to clarify their conceptions of its scope.
Branzburg denied a claim that newsmen have a constitu-
tional right to refuse to reveal their confidential sources6 4 to
grand juries.6 5 The reporters claimed that forced disclosure
would inhibit news gathering by causing sources to become
more cautious in the future6 6 and thus based their case upon
6 1 Id. at 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
62 Id. at 718 (Black, J.); 720 (Douglas, J.); 724 (Brennan, J.); 730 (Stewart, J.); 732
(White, J.); 741 (Marshall, J.). Under the fourteenth amendment, all state (as distin-
guished from federal) action abridging freedom of the press is barred. See, e.g., New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (common law libel action). See also Smith
v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 156-59 (1959) (Black, J., concurring).
63 408 U.S. 665, 727-28 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 720-24 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
64 Branzburg had written an article describing a "hashish factory" in Kentucky.
Pappas had been inside a Black Panther headquarters in Massachusetts as it was prepar-
ing to defend itself from a police raid. Caldwell had gained the confidence of Black
Panther Party leaders in California. In all three cases the newsmen were subpoenaed
before a grand jury for questioning about these sources.
63 This was a question of first impression for the Court. Newsmen's arguments for a
common law privilege had been rejected consistently by lower courts; assertions of a
constitutional privilege fared little better. See, e.g., Guest & Stanzler, The Constitutional
Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 18 (1969); Comment,
The Newsman's Privilege: Government Investigations, Criminal Prosecutions and Private
Litigation, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1198 (1970); Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitu-
tional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317 (1970).
A number of courts recognized a first amendment interest, but in most cases con-
sidered it outweighed, usually by the obligation of all citizens to give evidence, when the
opposing interests were balanced. E.g., Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); In re Goodfader, 45 Haw. 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961) (the
dissenting opinion is informative); cf. State v. Buchanan, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert.
denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968).
66Justice White characterized the reporters' claims as follows:
[T]o gather news it is often necessary to agree either not to identify the source
of information published or to publish only part of the facts revealed, or both;
... [and] if the reporter is nevertheless forced to reveal these confidences to a
grand jury, the source so identified and other confidential sources of other
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the proposition that news gathering is protected by the first
amendment.
The Court considered at length the empirical issue of the
extent to which news gathering is burdened by the denial of a
testimonial privilege to reporters.6" Writing for the Court,
Justice White pointed out that this burden is indirect: The
government does not forbid the use of confidential sources,
nor does it control the information. 68 He further stated that
the extent of the burden is highly speculative; 69 indeed, the
Court plainly believed that the restriction would be minimal:
"[T]he evidence fails to demonstrate that there would be a
significant constriction of the flow of news to the public if this
Court reaffirms the prior . . . rule .... ,,70 Moreover, Justice
White observed that by claiming a privilege reporters actually
impede a flow of information to the grand jury, another agent
of the public.7' From this perspective, the burden on total in-
formation flow from a ruling adverse to the reporters would
be of little consequence.
Thus, although recognizing that some burden on news
gathering would result from refusing to grant reporters a testi-
monial privilege before the grand jury, the Court found that
burden uncertain, indirect, and of little magnitude.
But is this burden on news gathering-albeit minimal-a
burden on first amendment rights? On this point the opinion
is brief. Early in his discussion Justice White states, "Nor is it
suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First Amend-
ment protection; without some protection for seeking out the
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated. '7 2 At the end
of his opinion he states, "Finally, as we have earlier indicated,
news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections,
reporters will be measurably deterred from furnishing publishable informa-
tion, all to the detriment of the free flow of information protected by the First
Amendment.
408 U.S. at 679-80. This argument was accepted by the dissenters.
6' At one point in the opinion, Justice White appeared to say that denial of a tes-
timonial privilege would not burden news gathering. 408 U.S. at 698. Other language,
however, indicates that this was not intended to deny entirely the existence of such a
burden. E.g., 408 U.S. at 690. For empirical studies of this question, see Blasi, The
Newsman's Privilege: An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REv. 229 (1971); Guest & Stanzler,
supra note 65.
68 408 U.S. at 681-82.
69 Id. at 693-94.
70 Id. at 693.
7 1 1d. at 697.
11 Id. at 681.
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and grand jury investigations if instituted or conducted other
than in good faith, would pose wholly different issues for reso-
lution under the First Amendment.
'7 3
Branzburg's recognition of a right to gather news is evi-
denced not simply by stray sentences scattered through the
opinion, but also by the opinion's overall content. That the
Court balances the burden on news gathering against the gov-
ernment's interest in disclosure suggests that the statements
quoted above are part of the holding in the case; and subsequent
lower court decisions and commentators have understood
Branzburg to establish that the collection of news involves rights
of constitutional dimension, however poorly defined.7 4 In fact,
the Court went to great lengths to show that certain tests of the
constitutionality of burdens upon first amendment rights were
satisfied in this situation. After discussing the history and
importance of the grand jury, 5 the Court concluded that a
"compelling" state interest 76 had been demonstrated:
The requirements of those cases ... which hold that a
State's interest must be "compelling" or "paramount"
to justify even an indirect burden on First Amend-
ment rights, are also met here. As we have indicated,
the investigation of crime by the grand jury imple-
ments a fundamental governmental role of securing
the safety of the person and property of the citizen,
and it appears to us that calling reporters to give testi-
mony in the manner and for the reasons that other
citizens are called "bears a reasonable relationship to
the achievement of the governmental purpose as-
serted as its justification." Bates v. Little Rock [361 U.S.
516 (1960)] at 525. If the test is that the government
73 1d. at 707. Justice Powell was the fifth justice to join the majority opinion, thereby
making it the opinion of the Court. His concurring opinion is similarly brief and tentative
on this point: "The Court does not hold that newsmen, subpoenaed to testify before a
grand jury, are without constitutional rights with respect to the gathering of news ... 
408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
74 See, e.g., United States v. Liddy, 478 F.2d 586, 587 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Baker v. F & F
Investment, 470 F.2d 778 (2nd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Significant
Developments, Constitutional Law-Newsmen's Privilege: A Challenge to Branzburg, 53 B.U.L.
REv. 497, 500-01 (1973); The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 137 (1972).
73 408 U.S. at 686-90.
76 See, e.g., DeGregory v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 825, 829 (1966); NAACP v. But-
ton, 371 U.S. 415, 438-39 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463-65 (1958);
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161
(1939).
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"convincingly show a substantial relation between the
information sought and a subject of overriding and
compelling state interest," Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963), it is
quite apparent [that the test has been met]. 77
The Court also concluded 78 that this state interest was not being
achieved by means having an unnecessarily broad impact on
first amendment rights.
79
That the Court engaged in these tests indicates it con-
sidered first amendment rights to be involved in this case. How-
ever, the Court's language permits the argument that since the
state met the compelling interest test, the question of which
test was appropriate was irrelevant and therefore not decided.
Although this is possible, the compelling interest test is tradi-
tional in this area, as the Court notes; 0 and less rigorous tests
are not even mentioned.
The better view, then, is that the Court held that there is a
right to gather news, and that even an indirect burden on this
right8l can be justified only by a compelling government inter-
est not effectuated by unnecessarily broad means. 82 The Court's
failure to clarify the scope of protection may be partly attributed
to its view that the balance was so one-sided: The news gather-
ing interest was implicated indirectly and minimally; the govern-
ment interest was perceived as overwhelming. Indeed, this
77 408 U.S. at 700-01.
78 Id. at 699-700.
7 9 See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56 (1965); NAACP v. Alabama, 377
U.S. 288, 307 (1964); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963); Schneider v. State,
308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). See also Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83
HARV. L. REv. 844 (1970); Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J.
464 (1969).
80 408 U.S. at 680. Additional language in the opinion supports the conclusion that
the Court felt a compelling interest test was required. In discussing the problems that
would result if a case-by-case balancing approach to a reporter's testimonial privilege was
adopted the Court stated: "[B]y considering whether enforcement of a particular law
served a 'compelling' governmental interest, the courts would be inextricably involved in
distinguishing between the value of enforcing different criminal laws." Id. at 705-06.
", Although it could have been contended that first amendment rights of the sources
were also involved in this case, the Court declined to take that conceptual leap from
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (anonymity of handbills). Instead, the Court
noted that "the privilege claimed is that of the reporter, not the informant," 408 U.S. at
695, and declined to consider the possibility that rights of the source might be involved.
Thus, only the right to gather information is on the first amendment side of the Court's
balance.
82 At least one lower court interpreted Branzburg to require a compelling state in-
terest in this area. See Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 784 (2d Cir. 1972).
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case is properly characterized more as a grand jury case than
as a free press case. The Court left no doubt of its view that
the grand jury was performing an "important, constitutionally
mandated role" in "a fundamental function of government,"83
and that every citizen has an obligation to testify about crimes.
8 4
II. ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT CONTROLLED INFORMATION
AFTER BRANZBURG
From Branzburg's tentative recognition that the press en-
joys a first amendment news-gathering right, the courts must
proceed to define its scope and precise content. This news-
gathering right will need especially careful definition in the
sensitive area of press efforts to obtain information held or
controlled by the government.8 5 The following paragraphs
attempt to suggest the appropriate parameters of a news-
gathering right covering efforts by the press to obtain such in-
formation. The Supreme Court's approach to this issue in
Branzburg and in Pell v. Procunier8 6 will be discussed and criti-
cized.
A. Special Access
If the virtue of the press lies in its ability, through its insti-
tutional nature, to gather and disseminate news to the public,
and if a freedom of the press, distinct from freedom of speech,
is guaranteed because of this virtue, 7 then it follows that in
some situations the journalist may appropriately be granted
special access to information controlled by the government.
Specifically, when the government wishes to impose re-
strictions on access to information, three situations are possible.
First, there may be a valid content-related reason for the re-
striction which outweighs any public right to be informed;
8 8
83 408 U.S. at 690.
84 Id. at 697.
85 Branzburg, of course, involved alleged government interference with the ability of
newsmen to obtain information from non-governmental sources.
86 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
87 See text accompanying notes 53-57 supra.
88 The concept of a public right to know, associated with Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969), has never been used by the Supreme Court to further
access to information in the face of government restrictions. Cf. Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 U.S. 753 (1972). Conceptually, recognition of an information-gathering element in
the freedom of the press clause is a prerequisite to the use of a "public right to know" to
gain access against a content-related defense.
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in that situation no question of special access arises. At the other
extreme, there may be no valid government reason sufficient
to justify the restriction, in which case equal access should be
given to both press and public. In between these two situations
is the case where the content of the information does not call
for secrecy, but where valid administrative reasons necessitate
denial of access to the general public. In such a situation, special
priority should be given to the press for efficiency reasons 89
The journalist can disseminate information with minimal dis-
ruption to those controlling it. Further, a journalist will have
undertaken, or possibly may have imposed upon him, the af-
firmative duty of making the information obtained available to
the public.90 Press access should be guaranteed precisely be-
cause of the institutional and professional nature of the press,
the value which is at the base of the proposed information-
gathering right.
This approach will require a definition of the press. Such a
definition would be difficult under the current first amendment
interpretation that freedom of the press is a fundamental per-
sonal right.91 Under the proposed approach, however, the task
would be considerably easier because the underlying policy
for resting this right in the press rather than in the public pro-
vides some guidance. Such factors as intent to publish, pre-
vious journalistic experience, and access to means of distribu-
tion would be relevant.92 Current Supreme Court doctrine
would appear to indicate that diversity of viewpoint rather
than mere circulation size should be considered in situations of
89 Because questions of special access will not involve regulations based upon con-
tent, the correct standard for judging special access claims is that formulated in United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968):
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitu-
tional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial
governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the sup-
pression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.
This approach was recently used by the Supreme Court to strike down prison mail
censorship in Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
"0 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), held that broadcasters, in
spite of their first amendment protection and because of the limited number of broadcast
frequencies, can be compelled to make additional information available to the public
when a controversial issue has not been presented fully or fairly.
9 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972). See also text accompanying
notes 54-59 supra.
92 See Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential
Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317, 365-67 (1970).
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limited access. 93 Further, the government already defines the
press for allocating police passes, entrance to legislative gal-
leries, news conferences, and the like.
94
B. Special Access in Branzburg
The opinion of the Court in Branzburg recognized a first
amendment protection for news gathering, but denied the
existence of a right of special access for journalists. On both
points the Court was taking hesitant steps into unfamiliar
terrain. Its assertions were qualified and tentative; there was
no exploration, even in dicta, of the scope or meaning of a news-
gathering right; and no attempt was made to reconcile such a
right with the denial of special access.
Specifically, Justice White's majority opinion stated: "It has
generally been held that the First Amendment does not guaran-
tee the press a constitutional right of special access to informa-
tion not available to the public generally." 95 Although such a
statement is not necessarily inconsistent with recognition of
first amendment protection for news gathering, at the very least
it reduces the scope of the protection. It is notable, however,
that the authority cited for the assertion that the courts have
"generally held" against special access is weak.
Of the four cases cited, only one, Zemel v. Rusk, 96 is a Su-
preme Court majority opinion. The plaintiff in that case was a
private citizen seeking to have his passport validated for travel
93 In another limited access area, broadcasting, the Supreme Court has held that the
right of the public to be informed includes the right to presentation of diverse view-
points. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The existence of this
right in the public was cited as one reason for denying individual members of the public
a general right of access to the airwaves. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Demo-
cratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973). Thus it would seem that in the area of free
speech, special access to a method of speaking can be justified if the speaker undertakes
the duty of presenting a diversity of views. This situation is somewhat analogous to the
right of special access urged here.
94 Comment, Has Branzburg Buried the Underground Press? 8 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS
-CIv. LIB. L. REv. 181, 194 (1973). On the common practice of forming press pools, see
Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 874 n. 17 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
95 408 U.S. at 684. This statement may be viewed in two ways: as directly negating
any first amendment protection for newsgathering and thus contradicting the earlier
statement, or more probably, as recognizing that the press has a first amendment right of
equal access, but no more. See Comment, supra note 94, at 184-85. A press right of equal
access has been recognized by courts for many years. See, e.g., Lee v. Hodges, 321 F.2d
480 (4th Cir. 1963); Providence Journal Co. v. McCoy, 94 F. Supp. 186, (D.R.I. 1950),
affd on other grounds, 190 F.2d 760 (1st Cir. 1951).
96 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
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to Cuba as a tourist.97 He based his case primarily on assertions
of his right to travel and a claim of improper delegation of con-
gressional authority to the executive. Zemel further stated that
the purpose of his trip was "to satisfy [his] curiosity about the
state of affairs in Cuba and to make [himself] a better informed
citizen. '98 The Court disagreed that a first amendment right
was involved. Invoking a test designed to measure the scope
of the freedom of speech clause-the "speech-action" dichot-
omy99-the Court noted that only action was inhibited 00 and
concluded: "The right to speak and publish does not carry
with it the unrestrained right to gather information."' 0 1 This
case simply does not speak to the proposition for which it is
cited. Zemel claimed a right to travel to Cuba as a citizen and a
member of the general public. He had no pretensions of being
an information disseminator of any kind. 10 2 A ruling in his
favor would have been a ruling that the public generally might
travel to Cuba. The notion of "special access" was not present
in the case.
The Branzburg Court also cited a concurring opinion in
New York Times Co. v. United States,10 3 where Justice Stewart
discussed the right of the executive to classify certain informa-
tion relating to government security. But the theory of special
access articulated in this Comment'0 4 would allow the denial
of access to both press and public where secrecy properly is
required by the content of the information in question. Al-
though this authority undercuts a claim for special press access
to government information that would otherwise remain con-
fidential, it is not apposite where the government's reason for
the restriction is not content-related.
The third authority is a Third Circuit case105 that did not
9 7Id. at 3.
9 8 Id. at 4.
" See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
100 381 U.S. at 16-17. This test is inappropriate to an information-gathering claim.
The active aspect of information gathering emanates from the press clause. To the extent
that there is a (passive) right to receive information, of course, free speech and assembly
are also involved. Cf. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
101 381 U.S. at 17.
102 Note that current regulations on foreign travel to restricted areas provide an
exemption for reporters, scholars, and private citizens with a demonstrated publisher. 22
C.F.R. §§ 51.73(b)(1), (b)(3) & (c)(1) (1973).
103 403 U.S. 713, 727 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).
"04 See text accompanying notes 87-94 supra.
105 Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958). Further
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involve a special access claim; journalists, challenging a ban on
the use of cameras and tape recorders in a courthouse, had
conceded that point and were arguing for greater access for
all. 10
6
Finally, the Court cited a New York Court of Appeals
case 10 7 in which the trial judge, on his own motion, had barred
press and public from court during the prosecution's presenta-
tion because of the offensive nature of the material to be pre-
sented. The underlying issue in this case was whether total
censorship in the name of public decency was justifiable.108 In
affirming the lower court's decision, the Court of Appeals failed
to discuss the constitutional issue, declaring that none was in-
volved' 0 9 and citing an earlier decision l" that had also failed
to discuss the issue. Notice, moreover, that the reason given for
excluding the press was content-related (the obscene nature
of the evidence and testimony to be presented), so that this
ruling is not dispositive of a claim of special access in non-con-
tent-related situations.
The Branzburg dictum,"' therefore, is weakly supported.
Only two of the cases involved claims of press access and these
were not claims to special access. There is some support for the
denial of access to everyone by content-related restrictions, but
none for the denial of special access to the press by restrictions
based upon the impracticality of affording access to all." x2 The
conceptual weaknesses of this opinion are discussed in text accompanying notes 38-41
supra.
106 In Tribune the court stated:
Nor do [the newspapers] deny outright the statement of the district court that
the press here has no more right than any other member of the public although
they do say that the district judge made more of this than he should have.
254 F.2d at 884. Thus, the issue was whether a ban encompassing both press and general
public was justifiable.
,17 United Press Associations v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
108 To the extent that the Branzburg dictum indicates that an absolute ban on attend-
ing or publicizing a trial is permissible, 408 U.S. at 685, the cited authority provides no
support. Neither of the cited cases questioned the right of the press to attend trials in an
orderly manner. See note 10 supra. In Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 (1947), the
Court stated: "A trial is a public event. What transpires in the Courtroom is public
property. . . . There is no special perquisite of the judiciary which enables it . . . to
suppress, edit, or censor events which transpire in proceedings before it."
109 308 N.Y. at 77, 123 N.E.2d at 778.
110 Danziger v. Hearst Corp., 304 N.Y. 244, 107 N.E.2d 62 (1952).
,1 No claim of a right of special access was made in Branzburg, nor, indeed, could
one have been made in that factual context.
1
12 Branzburg goes on to say:
Despite the fact that news gathering may be hampered, the press is regularly
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Court's phrasing is explicable, however, in terms of the uncom-
mon press claim before it: The newsmen in question were as-
serting a right to withhold information from the public (as
represented by the grand jury).1 13 Normally any constitutional
right of "special access" will culminate in gathering and dis-
seminating the same information; if the press is given access,
the information will not remain "not available to the public."
Therefore, even if this dictum denying the press a special right
of access is accepted in the Branzburg context, it should not be
read to restrict the right of the press to gather information
generally.
C. Special Access in Pell and Washington Post
In Pell v. Procunier14 and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 115
journalists challenged state and federal regulations allowing
random conversations but prohibiting all in-depth press-
prisoner interviews."16 The California regulation had been
excluded from grand jury proceedings, our own conferences, the meetings of
other official bodies gathered in executive session, and the meetings of private
organizations. Newsmen have no constitutional right of access to the scenes of
crime or disaster when the general public is excluded ....
408 U.S. at 684-85. This statement also is largely irrelevant to a special access claim
narrowed to non-content-related situations. Grand jury restrictions, court conferences,
and executive sessions involve the exclusion of the press for reasons of content. Although
in particular cases these content-related reasons may be challenged, a successful chal-
lenge would open the information to both press and public. The meetings of private
organizations ordinarily do not involve state action and are therefore outside the scope of
the first amendment. Restrictions of access to scenes of crime and disaster sometimes can
be justified on content grounds; even in a non-content-related context, a press claim
often would be outweighed by a "clear and present danger." It does not follow that in
this and tamer situations a press access claim lacks constitutional dimensions. Moreover,
Justice White provides no authority, either of law or custom, in support of his statement.
Evidence of custom opposing Justice White's statement is the practice of allowing news-
men access to the scenes of riots in the late 1960's. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 207-09 (Government Printing Office ed. 1968).
113 Of course, the newsmen claimed that the withholding would generate a greater
flow of information from future confidential sources, but the Court rejected the argu-
ment. See notes 66-71 supra & accompanying text.
H4 417 U.S. 817 (1974). This case also involved an unsuccessful challenge based on
the rights of the prisoners, a subject which is outside the scope of this Comment.
5 417 U.S. 843 (1974). Since the Court found this case to be controlled by the
holding in Pell, see id. at 850, references to both cases will be cited only to Pell.
"I California Department of Corrections regulation § 415,071; U.S. Bureau of Pris-
ons Policy Statement § 1220.1A (Feb. 11, 1972). The latter was amended after the grant
of certiorari in Washington Post, to allow interviews at minimum security institutions, see
417 U.S. at 844, but the ban remains absolute with respect to the rest of the federal
prison system. For the definition of "conversation" and "interview," see Washington Post
Co. v. Kleindienst, 494 F.2d 994, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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promulgated in 1971,"1 supplanting more open rules; the
federal rule, however, was longstanding." 8 The journalists
argued that only through interviews could they adequately re-
port news from inside prisons. The government response was
that there are other means of access; that administration, se-
curity, uniformity, discipline and rehabilitation warrant the
prohibitions; and especially that interviews can help certain
disruptive inmates attain negative leadership roles culminating
in violence. These legitimate governmental interests were noted
at the beginning of both opinions for the Court, apparently to
show that no invidious discrimination against the press was in-
volved. The substantiality of these interests was questionable
in light of testimony by corrections officials from other juris-
dictions that, on balance, interviews were helpful.1 9 The Court,
however, was not constrained to discuss them in depth, because
it found no constitutional interest in opposition
20
This would have been a good case in which to argue the
theory of special access advanced in this Comment. The jour-
nalists were seeking information to which the government
controlled access, and the government was not contending
the information that the prisoners might communicate re-
quired secrecy in and of itself. The government's argument
that it could not handle the general public was persuasive, but
could have been countered by asserting the efficiencies of
allowing the press to conduct interviews as representatives of
the public. The government's major argument against press
interviews was that publicity gave power to certain disruptive
inmates, known as "big wheels." This apparently was a legiti-
mate concern, but it clearly could have been satisfied by less
than an absolute prohibition. For example, the ban might have
been applied only to prisoners whom prison officials considered
117 417 U.S. at 831.
118 Brief for Petitioners at 3, Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
119 Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 869-70 (1974) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing); Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, 357 F. Supp. 779 (1972); Brief for Respondents
at 18-23, Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
120 "In this case, however, it is unnecessary to engage in any delicate balancing of
such penal considerations against the legitimate demands of the First Amendment." 417
U.S. at 849. A balancing is undertaken in the dissents of Justice Powell, 417 U.S. 850, and
of Justice Douglas, 417 U.S. at 836, as well as in prior lower court considerations of this
issue, e.g., Washington Post Co. v. Kleindienst, 494 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1974), aff'g 357 F.
Supp. 779 (D.D.C. 1972); Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Kleindienst, 364 F. Supp.
719 (S.D. Tex. 1973). See also Seattle-Tacoma Newspaper Guild v. Parker, 480 F.2d 1062
(9th Cir. 1973); Hillery v. Procunier, 364 F. Supp. 196 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
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potentially disruptive. 12 1 The journalists could have argued
forcefully that the absolute prohibition placed an unnecessary
burden on first amendment rights requiring some accommoda-
tion along special access lines.122 Justice Powell's dissenting
opinion in this case demonstrates the possibilities for such a
special access approach.
123
But the plaintiffs apparently were afraid openly to claim
any special rights for the press. Instead they argued that an in-
terview right would only equalize them with the rest of the
public, many of whom (friends, family, clergy, attorneys) are
allowed interviews with inmates. 124 No member of the Court
accepted this argument; 25 Justice Stewart noted 126 that inter-
views are allowed only to those personally or professionally
related to an inmate. Having rejected the "equalizing" perspec-
tive on the factual situation, the Court was faced with the ques-
tion whether the journalists' interest in conducting individual
in-depth inmate interviews, which the public was not allowed
to conduct, is of constitutional dimensions. The resolution of
this question involved a legal issue-whether in this context
there is a constitutional right of special press access-and an
empirical one-whether available modes of news gathering
other than interviews satisfy this right, thereby rendering un-
necessary recognition of constitutional protection for the
specific interview technique.
Justice Stewart's discussion of special access is very brief.
He quotes the special access remarks in Branzburg discussed
above, adding: "[N]ewsmen have no constitutional right of
access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the
121 For an interesting criticism of Pell and its failure to employ a less restrictive
alternative analysis see The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 43, 165 (1974).
122 See note 89 supra.
123 417 U.S. at 850 (Powell, J., dissenting).
124 Brief for Appellant at 6, Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974): "The press-
appellants are seeking not 'special' privileges but visiting rights that are available to
family, clergy, attorneys, and many others every day in the year." Brief for Respondents
at 43-44, Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974): "What respondents do
claim is the same right to interview inmates that is enjoyed by relatives, friends, lawyers,
clergymen, public officials, former and prospective employers, and other persons who
are permitted by the Bureau of Prisons to have private conversations in depth with
inmates."
125 This perspective had been accepted by the Court of Appeals, 494 F.2d 994, 999
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
126 417 U.S. at 831 n.8. See also id. at 857 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 841 (Douglas,
J., dissenting).
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general public .... The Constitution does not. .. require
government to accord to the press special access to information
not shared by the public generally."'127 The proposition "that
the Constitution imposes upon government the affirmative
duty to make available to journalists sources of information not
available to members of the public generally," Justice Stewart
concludes, "finds no support in the words of the Constitution
or in any decision of this Court."'
128
This language in Pell narrowly defines the scope of con-
stitutional protection for news gathering which had been
recognized in such vague terms in Branzburg. The main source
cited by the Court in denying a right of special access is the
Branzburg dictum discussed earlier.' 29 Our analysis of that
dictum showed that it lacked support even in the context of
Branzburg. This is even more true in the Pell situation, where
the reporters were not attempting to keep secret the informa-
tion to which they sought access. The adoption of that dictum
here without an analysis either of its supporting authority or
of the different posture of the reporters' arguments was clearly
unwarranted.
The holding in Branzburg certainly does not preclude a
right of special access, as Justice Powell's dissent in Pell recog-
nizes.' 30 The Court in Pell also cited Zemel v. Rusk' 3' and New
127 Id. at 834. Technically, the phrasing of this sentence is misleading because the
journalists claimed access in order to share the information with the public.
This assertion is followed by a footnote reference to Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1
(1965), where the Court denied an "unrestricted right to gather information." This
reference was apparently intended to express the Court's fears that a special access right,
if granted, would get out of hand. Justice Powell's remarks about avoiding dry logic are
sufficient answer to those fears. 417 U.S. at 860 (dissenting opinion). See also id. at 872.
Zemel is discussed at text accompanying notes 96-102 supra.
128 417 U.S. at 834-35. The phrasing, "no affirmative duty," implies that the first
amendment is inapplicable because it prohibits only restrictions. But the government
posture in this case may be viewed as either negative or positive, depending on one's view
of the proper scope of news gathering under our constitutional scheme. If one views the
first amendment as supporting openness of information, the government would appear
to be infringing upon that value by cutting off access to prisons. If one views the first
amendment as merely protecting values of expression, then the government would ap-
pear to be maintaining a valid regulation and the effect of lifting that regulation would
be to impose an affirmative duty. The Court seems to have adopted the latter view, but
such a proposition is certainly not self-evident.
129 408 U.S. at 684; text accompanying notes 95-113 supra.
130 To read Branzburg only to protect invidious discrimination against the press, as
Pell appears to do, seems to confuse protections afforded by the first amendment with
those afforded by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth.
131 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
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York Times Co. v. United States'32 as tangential support for its
denial of a right of special access. 133 Clearly, however, these
cases require this conclusion no more than they support the
dictum for which they are cited in Branzburg. 1 34 To the extent
the Court indicates that the first amendment or precedent
compels a ruling against special access, the opinion is unsup-
ported. This is rather strikingly demonstrated by the very fact
that four Justices dissented. 135
Because the case law cited does not provide support, the
holding in Pell comes down to the Court's perspective on the
constitutional balance between the press and government. The
Court's view of this balance is presented in a conclusory way,
without inquiry into the historical foundations of the current
situation. As a result, the Court ignores the crucial fact that
the enormous growth in governmental secrecy since World War
II has fundamentally altered the balance that previously
existed.1 36 Historical research indicates that the early Republic
was characterized by a general openness of information, which
lasted substantially, if decreasingly, into the present century. 137
Viewed in this light, the Court's conclusory acceptance of the
present situation as constitutionally valid is unjustified.
Moreover, Pell was clearly not an appropriate case in which
to decide the fate of special access as a general matter. First,
the constitutional arguments for special access were not pre-
sented to the Court; the journalists tried to characterize the
situation as involving only equal access problems.13 8 Second,
in the Court's view the press already enjoyed greater access to
prisoners than did the public generally. 139 Finally, because of
the "big wheel" phenomenon, 40 press access to certain pris-
132403 U.S. 713 (1971).
133 Pell v. Procunier, 471 U.S. 817, 834 (1974).
134 See text accompanying notes 95-113 supra.
135 "The Constitution specifically selected the press ... to play an important role in
the discussion of public affairs." Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966), quoted in Pell,
417 U.S. at 863 (Powell, J., dissenting).
136 Notes 11-15 supra & accompanying text.
137 Notes 11-32 supra & accompanying text.
138 See note 124 supra & accompanying text.
139 417 U.S. at 830-31. Indeed, it could be argued that the broad constitutional
proposition quoted above was actually narrowed by the Court's perceptions that the
media already had more access than the public and that the interview technique would
add little of importance to the access already afforded the press. See Nimmer, supra note
46, at 643-44.
140 417 U.S. at 831-32.
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oners presented problems not created by public access generally.
This seems contrary to the more usual situation in which the
press will be especially well equipped to gather information
with a minimum of disruption. For these reasons, Pell should
not be considered invulnerable to being overruled or restricted
to its facts in a later special access case.
III. CONCLUSION
When the government wishes to impose restrictions on
access to information, it may offer a reason that is content-re-
lated or one that is not. Affirmative reasons such as national se-
curity or executive privilege,141 in support of an assertion that
the information demands secrecy, are equally valid against the
press and the general public, and no question of special access
is raised. A special access question arises only when the govern-
ment reason is non-content-related; that situation may present'
administrative problems that properly make general public
access impossible, but that are insufficient to compel exclusion
of a manageable number of professionals who could disseminate
the information to the general public. The efficiencies of this
approach have led many official bodies to adopt policies per-
mitting regular press access to information not generally made
available to the public, such as police blotters, local government
committee discussions, and even court chambers conferences.
In other cases, however, press access to information deserving
publicity is resisted because public access is not feasible and
the government does not wish to accord the press a special
privilege. The egalitarian argument is attractive and easily
made-too easily made, for it effectively deprives the public
of information not requiring secrecy.
In Pell v. Procunier the Court upheld prohibitions on press-
prisoner interviews in broad language that rejected special ac-
cess. When information-gathering cases arise in the future, the
Court's unequivocal rejection of special access in Pell should be
reconsidered.
141 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
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